Is Adjudication a Public Good?: “Overcrowded Courts” and the Private-Sector Alternative of Arbitration by Ware, Stephen J.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\14-3\CAC313.txt unknown Seq: 1 30-APR-13 15:32
IS ADJUDICATION A PUBLIC GOOD?
“OVERCROWDED COURTS” AND THE
PRIVATE SECTOR ALTERNATIVE
OF ARBITRATION
Stephen J. Ware*
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts are underfunded, dockets are crowded, and litigation is
slow.  These observations lead many lawyers and judges to call for
increased court funding.  While I would like to see a significantly
higher percentage of government spending go to courts, I do not
believe that is likely to happen.  So I suggest we think about “un-
derfunded” courts differently.
Courts provide a service—binding adjudication—to disputing
parties.  This service is heavily subsidized by tax dollars, as only a
portion of courts’ costs are covered by fees paid by litigants.  This
public subsidy, basic economics suggests, causes demand for this
service to exceed supply so disputing parties queue up to receive
the subsidy.  A court’s time and other resources are allocated
among parties according to their willingness to wait.  In contrast,
other goods and services are, in a market economy, allocated ac-
cording to willingness to pay.  If parties had to pay more to use the
court system, fewer would use it, and thus those who did would not
have to wait so long.
In short, the related phenomena of “underfunded” courts,
crowded dockets and justice delayed are caused by the public sub-
sidy for litigants.  Focus on this subsidy for parties in litigation en-
ables a contrast with the absence of a subsidy for parties in the
private sector alternative to litigation, arbitration, which (like liti-
gation) also provides disputing parties with binding adjudication.
While the public-sector court system provides binding adjudication
virtually free of charge to the disputing parties, the private sector
arbitration system generally charges them something like market
rates for it.
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Which disputing parties deserve subsidized adjudication and
which should have to pay market rate for it?  Our society’s failure
to confront this important question allows all disputing parties to
pursue the subsidy for themselves.  The result is that parties who
do not deserve the subsidy—parties who should be paying market
rates for adjudication—are consuming public resources that would
be better spent on parties who do deserve the subsidy.
One way to end the public subsidy for cases that do not de-
serve it is for courts to charge the parties to such a case a fee high
enough to reimburse the court for its costs of adjudicating the case.
Several thoughtful commentators have proposed such “user fees.”
This Article assesses those proposals and suggests that user fees
would make litigation look more like arbitration.  It concludes by
considering the possibility that the public-sector court system and
private arbitration organizations could compete in the market for
unsubsidized adjudication and in the market for subsidized adjudi-
cation.  In short, this Article places discussions of overcrowded
courts and court user fees in the context of a society—our soci-
ety—with a strong private sector alternative to our courts.
II. “OVERCROWDED COURTS” AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
ALTERNATIVE OF ARBITRATION
A. “Overcrowded Courts”
The economic downturn of the last few years required many
families and businesses to reduce their spending.  The same is true
of state court systems.1  State court funding cuts in recent years
have prompted protests decrying the harms caused by underfunded
courts.2  In the words of American Bar Association (“ABA”) Pres-
1 “The court funding crisis is yet another byproduct of the Great Recession that hit the
United States in late 2007.” James Podgers, Your ABA, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2012, at 58. “According
to the National Center for State Courts, forty-seven states have experienced funding reductions
since 2010, and most states already allocate less than two percent of their budgets for the
courts.” Id. See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, State Budget Cuts Threaten Public’s
Access to Courts, (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/Backgrounder/2011/Court-
Budget-cuts.Aspx.
2 On January 18, a group called the Open Courts Coalition held a rally on Grand Avenue in
Los Angeles to support funding for California’s judiciary. “Yes, you read that right—a rally for
our courts that brought together members of the legal profession, the business community and
labor leaders. It was a defining moment, and one we hope will be repeated in the coming months
as we stand up and speak out for full funding for our judiciary.” See Wm. T. (Bill) Robinson III,
No Courts, No Justice, No Freedom, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2012, at 9.
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ident Bill Robinson, “[s]tate court underfunding is a threat to our
system of justice and all we believe in as Americans and as an asso-
ciation. It is harming clients, slowing our nation’s economic recov-
ery and undermining our liberty.”3
If the reality is anywhere near this dire—“a threat to our sys-
tem of justice and all we believe in as Americans”—then we truly
have a crisis on our hands.  Still worse, it appears to be a long-
running crisis.  Cries of alarm about underfunded courts, crowded
dockets and justice delayed, which we all know is justice denied,4
have been sounded by lawyers and courts for over a half a century.
In 2012, the ABA President warned that “court underfunding
is a threat to our system of justice.”5  Similarly, the previous decade
was also a “time of scarce judicial resources and crowded dockets”6
so the ABA in 2004 “formed a Commission on State Court Fund-
ing . . . to point out that underfunded courts lack adequate re-
sources to meet caseload demands.”7  Similarly, hanging over the
1990’s was a “looming crisis in the nation” due in part to “danger-
ously crowded dockets” and “overburdened judges.”8  In 1993, an
3 Id.
4 Or, in the lingo of economics, “courts with congested dockets exact social costs at two
interrelated levels: (1) they impose a direct cost to litigants by decreasing the time value of
litigation; and (2) they impose an indirect cost to litigants by undermining the deterrence effect
and other social benefits of civil liability.” Bruce L. Hay, et al., Litigating BP’s Contribution
Claims in Publicly Subsidized Courts: Should Contracting Parties Pay Their Own Way?, 64
VAND. L. REV. 1919, 1931–32 (2011).
5 Id.
6 Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We recognize the impor-
tance of the district court having the ability to control its own docket, particularly in this time of
scarce judicial resources and crowded dockets.”); accord E.E.O.C. v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266
F.R.D. 260, 265 (D. Minn. 2009) (“As a vehicle designed to streamline the flow of litigation
through our crowded dockets, we do not take case management orders lightly, and will enforce
them.”); Report of the Section of Litigation, Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations, 127
A.B.A. No. 2 Ann. Rep. 439, 439 (2002) (“Courts and court rules encourage settlement of dis-
putes as a means of dealing with burgeoning case loads, increasingly crowded dockets, and scar-
city of judicial resources.”).
7 Dennis W. Archer, Tackling Tough Issues, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2004, at 8.
8 Report of the King County Bar Association, 123 A.B.A. NO. 1 ANN. REP. 389, 390 (1998)
(“There is a looming crisis in the nation because of the extraordinary number of vacant federal
judicial positions and the problems associated with delayed judicial appointment, dangerously
crowded dockets, suspended civil case dockets, burgeoning criminal caseloads, overburdened
judges, and courts which are chronically understaffed.”) See also Patrick E. Longan, Congress,
The Courts, and The Long Range Plan, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 661 (1997) (“Congress systemati-
cally has underfunded the courts.”); J.D. Page & Doug Sigel, Bifurcated Trials in Texas Practice:
The Advantages of Greater Use of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 174(b), 9 REV. LITIG. 49, 75
(1990) (“In this age of crowded dockets, soaring legal costs, and declining public confidence in
the legal system, courts should use bifurcation in all cases in which appropriate grounds for
bifurcated trial exist.”); Debra Cassens Moss, Planning Ahead, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 20 (“The
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ABA committee issued a report providing an “Overview of the
Crisis in America’s System of Justice.”9
Going back further in time reveals more of the same.  In the
1980’s, one ABA president wrote a column entitled “the un-
derfunded commitment to justice,”10 and a few years later a differ-
ent ABA president said “[w]e must attack the underfunding of the
justice system.”11  In the 1970’s, an ABA report said problems like
“[o]vercrowded dockets” and “generally inadequate resources”
had “reached crisis proportions.”12  While this “crisis” in the 1970’s
was “alarming,”13 in the 1960’s it was “staggering.”14  A 1969 com-
mentator said “[t]he increased workload which has engulfed the
courts had already stretched our judicial system to its limits by the
mid-twentieth century.”15  This assessment of the mid-twentieth
problems considered most serious by judges include delays in filling judicial vacancies, the im-
pact of the criminal docket on the civil docket of district courts, and the volume of criminal
cases. To deal with crowded dockets, judges apparently favor controlling caseloads over increas-
ing judgeships.”).
9 Saving Our System: A National Overview of the Crisis in America’s System of Justice. Pre-
pared on behalf of the American Bar Association, Special Committee on Funding the Justice
System (Aug.1993) (emphasis added).
10 Morris Harre, The Underfunded Commitment to Justice, 69 A.B.A. J. 528, 528 (1983).
11 Rhonda McMillion, Lobbying For Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1988, at 133 (ABA President
Robert MacCrate said “[n]othing has a more deleterious effect on the quality of justice in
America than this severe underfunding of our justice system.”) See also MacCrate Outlines His
Goals, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1987, at 20 (“We must attack the underfunding of the justice system”). See
also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of
Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983) (“federal courts today labor under staggering
workloads. They have too much business. Some of it must be trimmed if the quality of federal
justice is to remain high.”).
12 Report No. 4 of the Judicial Administration Division, 98 A.B.A. Ann. Rep. 857, 857 (1973).
The magnitude and complexity of the many problems facing the judicial system
of the United States today have reached crisis proportions.  That this statement is not
mere hyperbole is evident from even a cursory examination of the conditions of our
courts.  At every level of the judiciary, difficulties of a truly alarming nature are com-
monplace.  Overcrowded dockets, insufficient personnel, antiquated procedures and
generally inadequate resources are the rule, while speedy, fair and smooth resolution
of conflict is the exception in far too many cases.
Id.
13 Id.
14 Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Embryonic Guidelines for the
Consolidation of Pretrial Proceedings, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 786, 786 (1970) [hereinafter Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation]
Although the problem of lagging justice is thousands of years old, its dimensions
have recently reached staggering proportions. Our modern society has created de-
mands on our judicial establishment which amount to a “law explosion.” The in-
creased workload, which has engulfed the courts, had already stretched our judicial
system to its limits by the mid-twentieth century.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
15 Id.
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century is confirmed by a 1952 report stating that “[t]he problem of
the crowded docket is one which in recent years has grown more
and more disturbing.”16  Some suggest this problem goes back, not
just these sixty years, but for hundreds, or even thousands, of
years.17  In short, the “crisis” of “underfunded” courts, crowded
dockets and justice delayed may always be with us.18
What are we to make of this perpetual crisis?  First, that it
confirms the predictions one would make based on some simple
economics:
Courts receive some of their revenue from fees paid by litigants,
but most comes from the taxpayer.  In short, litigation, and es-
16 Comm. on Practice and Procedure of the Junior Bar Section, The Perennial Problem of the
Crowded Docket, 26 CONN. B.J. 327, 327 (1952).
The problem of the crowded docket is one that in recent years has grown more
and more disturbing, not only to the professional jurist but more significantly, to the
general public.  It is axiomatic that any proper system of justice demands not only
that impeccably fair decisions be rendered in our courts but that the litigant secure
his hearing as speedily as is reasonably possible.  Public confidence in the integrity of
our legal system seems to diminish in proportion to the amount of time it takes for a
case to be concluded.
Id. See also Howes Leather Co. v. La Buy, 226 F.2d 703, 709 (7th Cir. 1955) (“In this day of
crowded dockets and voluminous calendars, the position now advanced by respondent, if
adopted, would make reference to a master the rule rather than the exception in every case of a
complicated nature which is filed in the district court.”); David F. Maxwell, The President’s Page,
42 A.B.A. J. 899, 899 (1956).
One of the primary aims of the organized Bar always has been to improve the
administration of justice.  Today the challenge in that field is greater than ever
before.  By reason of congested court calendars in many judicial districts the courts
have been subjected to sharp criticism editorially, in the press and in other forums of
public opinion, because, as so often has been said, justice delayed is justice denied.
Id.; Earl Warren, The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar Alike, 44 A.B.A. J. 1043,
1045 (Nov. 1958) (“The federal judiciary does not stand alone in its problems . . . some of our
state courts report trial delays up to five and six years.”).
17 Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 14, at 786:
As a result of multiplying caseloads and expanding backlogs, American courts
are currently struggling with congested calendars and delayed litigation.  However,
the problem of court congestion and delay is not of recent origin. As early as 600
years before the dawn of the Christian era, the prophet Habacuc stated: “[T]he law is
torn in pieces, and judgment cometh not to the end . . . . The problem was also
recognized in the thirteenth century when the drafters of the Magna Carta pledged
that: “To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice.” Never-
theless, two centuries later “[d]evices for delaying, hindering, and obstructing alto-
gether the work of the fifteenth century Court of Common Pleas were many.”
Congestion and delay in the 16th century German courts caused Goethe to lose his
taste for the law and turn to the profession of letters.  At the beginning of the 17th
century, Shakespeare’s Hamlet, in his soliloquy, catalogued life’s “troubles” and
listed among them “the law’s delay.” (citations omitted).
Id.
18 The current ABA president says “the crisis of underfunding for the courts [is] an issue that
will take years to address.” Podgers, supra note 1, at 58.
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pecially trials, are subsidized by government.  As with other sub-
sidized goods and services, demand exceeds supply.  Litigants
must wait for a trial, sometimes for years.  Trial time is allocated
according to willingness to wait.  In contrast, other goods and
services are, in a market economy, allocated according to will-
ingness to pay.  If parties had to pay more to use the court sys-
tem, fewer parties would use it so those who did would not have
to wait as long.19
In short, the perpetual “crisis” of “underfunded” courts, crowded
dockets and justice delayed is caused by the public subsidy for liti-
gants.  Focus on this subsidy for parties in litigation enables a con-
trast with the absence of a subsidy for parties in the private sector
alternative to litigation, arbitration.
B. Arbitration
While arbitration and litigation are not identical, they do offer
disputing parties the same basic service—legally binding adjudica-
tion.20  Arbitration provides such adjudication to a wide variety of
19 STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 3.44 (2d ed.
2007); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 262 (1998) (“We are accus-
tomed to paying for . . . courts and court personnel by tax receipts.  This ‘public good’ arrange-
ment encourages overuse by some until court backlogs and overcrowding create queues that
substitute for prices or fees to clear the market.”); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Book Review, 85
TUL. L. REV. 247, 259 (2010) (reviewing HAZEL GENN,—SAVING CIVIL JUSTICE: JUDGING CIVIL
JUSTICE (2010)):
Although the English system does provide fee reductions for the impecunious
and subsidizes some family and small claim matters, about eighty percent of the cost
of the civil side of the court system is paid for through user fees. Filing fees alone can
exceed £1000, and then each step in the process—such as assigning the case to a
track, filing motions, holding hearings, and receiving orders—also requires the pay-
ment of a fee. Compared to that, filing fees in most U.S. courts are modest, and the
cost of running the courts comes from state and local government budgets.
Id.
20 Arbitration is adjudication in a private (non-government) forum, while litigation is adjudi-
cation in a government forum, a court. WARE, supra note 19, at 19. See also Thomas J. Stipa-
nowich, The Arbitration Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of
Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427, 427 (2007) (“Arbitration law is implicitly founded on a
procedural model involving binding adjudication of disputes by a private tribunal pursuant to an
agreement.”) For a definition of adjudication, see infra note 29.
While arbitration’s ability to provide legally-binding adjudication makes it a fairly close sub-
stitute for litigation, most other processes of dispute resolution, such as mediation, do not pro-
vide legally-binding adjudication and thus are not close substitutes for litigation. WARE, supra
note 19, at 8–11. “Non-binding arbitration has less in common with arbitration than it does with
mediation and other processes in aid of negotiation.” WARE, supra note 19, at § 2.2. Non-bind-
ing arbitration is not discussed in this Article.
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parties with a wide variety of disputes and has done so for many
years.21  Arbitration in the United States is well equipped with fine
arbitrators,22 well established administering organizations (like the
American Arbitration Association, the JAMS and many trade as-
sociations),23 and a well-developed legal structure under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act24 and case law, which ensures that arbitrators’
decisions are generally confirmed and enforced (rather than va-
cated) by courts.25
The core principle of arbitration law is that disputes do not go
to arbitration unless the parties have contracted to send them
there.26  Contracting for arbitration can occur before or after a dis-
pute arises.  Sometimes parties with an existing dispute agree to
send that dispute to arbitration.  More common are pre-dispute ar-
bitration agreements.  These are contracts containing a clause pro-
viding that, if a dispute arises, the parties will resolve that dispute
in arbitration, rather than litigation.  Arbitration clauses appear in
a wide variety of contracts.27
A downside of arbitration for the disputing parties is that they
have to pay for it.28  While “litigation receives a sizable govern-
21 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 934 (1999) (noting “once confined to the specialized prov-
inces of international commercial transactions and labor-management relations, arbitration
clauses now appear in many day-to-day consumer transactions”); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration
and Assimilation, 77 WASH U. L. Q. 1053, 1059 (2000).
Contracts in a huge variety of contexts contain clauses requiring the parties to
submit disputes to general arbitration. Examples of such contracts include: a retail
installment contract between an auto dealer and a consumer, a home termite protec-
tion plan, a construction contract between a university and a contractor, a homeown-
ers insurance policy, and a consumer loan agreement.
Id.
22 Stuart Widman, Courts or Arbitrators—Who Decides Arbitrability Issues, CBA REC., Jan.
2006, at 34 (referring to “the high quality of arbitrators on the AAA and JAMS panels”).
23 Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of Religious Ar-
bitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 436–37
(2006) (noting that “arbitration . . . is conducted under the auspices of different umbrella organi-
zations” and that besides the several national arbitration organizations, “quite a few industries
that maintain their own arbitration boards”).
24 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
25 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002).
26 9 U.S.C. § 2.
27 “These arbitration clauses typically are written broadly to cover any dispute the parties’
transaction might produce, but also can be written more narrowly to cover just some potential
disputes.” WARE, supra note 19, at § 2.3(a).
28 An early leader of the ADR Movement put it as follows:
[A]lthough I believe, on the basis of my own arbitration experience, that that
process is, by and large, as effective as and cheaper than litigation, lawyers tend not
to make extensive use of it (outside of special areas such as labor and commercial
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ment subsidy[,] arbitration does not.”29  The fees litigants pay to
courts do not cover the full cost of the judge, jury, court clerk,
other administrative personnel, and the courthouse itself.  By con-
trast, “parties to arbitration must pay the arbitrator’s fee, as well as
the administrative costs of the arbitration organization, and any
cost of the hearing room.30
law), in part because it is always cheaper for the clients to have society rather than
the litigants pay the judges.
Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address at the National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70
F.R.D. 79 (1976), at 125–26. See also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Publisher’s View on ‘The Costs of
Arbitration’, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., May 2003, at 103 (“The court system, of
course, is almost entirely paid for by taxpayers; whether or not we ever use that public resource,
we are subsidizing its use by others, including private individuals, government entities or corpo-
rations. The costs of alternative private adjudication must also be borne by someone”).
29 Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbi-
tration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP RESOL. 433, 447 (2010). See also Exelon Generation
Co., LLC v. Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 682 F.3d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) denying
rehearing en banc from 676 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner J. concurring) (“adjudication is
subsidized by the government and arbitration is not. The public subsidy of the courts places
arbitrators at a cost disadvantage.”)  Judge Posner, like several others, uses the term “adjudica-
tion” to refer to litigation but not arbitration, while I use the term “adjudication” to refer to any
process in which a third party hears evidence and argument and then decides the result of the
dispute. WARE, supra note 19, at §§ 1.5(a), 4.2 (defining litigation as adjudication in a govern-
mental forum and arbitration as adjudication in a non-governmental forum).  I believe this latter
usage better captures the similarities and differences litigation and arbitration have with each
other and with other processes of dispute resolution. See also ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL.,
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 21 (4th ed. 2006) (“‘Adjudica-
tion’ refers to the process by which final, authoritative decisions are rendered by a neutral third
party who enters the controversy without previous knowledge of the dispute.”); 1 IAN R. MAC-
NEIL, RICHARD SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 2.6.1 n.1
(1994) (describing arbitration as a “form of adjudication.”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) (“[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adju-
dication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected [disputing] party a peculiar form of partici-
pation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his
favor.”); Sander, supra note 28, at 116 (“Of course quite a variety of procedures fit under the
label of adjudication. Aside from the familiar judicial model, there is arbitration, and the admin-
istrative process.”)
30 Drahozal & Ware, supra note 29, at 447–48 (internal quotations omitted); Hay, et al.,
supra note 4, at 1924.
Although litigation in the court system obviously is not free to the parties, the
public still bears a substantial amount of the costs of adjudication. Foremost among
these costs is the time that public officers devote to adjudication—time that the par-
ties do not pay for and that the officials could have spent on other cases if the parties
had opted for a private alternative. Yet if they resort to private alternatives, such as
arbitration, . . . the parties must pay . . . for arbitrators to resolve [any disputes].
Id.
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In short, government subsidizes the “adjudicator costs” of liti-
gation,31 but not of arbitration.32  The public-sector court system
31 Following a prior article, I use the term “adjudicator costs” to describe the costs of paying
for the adjudicator (arbitrator, judge, jury) and support for the adjudicator (e.g., employees of
the court system or arbitration organization, and the courthouse or hearing room). Drahozal &
Ware, supra note 29, at 447–48.  Adjudicator costs should be distinguished from other “process
costs” such as “the time and legal fees spent on pleadings, discovery, motions, trial or hearing,
and appeal.” Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements - with
Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 258 (2006).
Arbitration’s process costs may be so much lower than litigation’s as to more than make up for
arbitration’s higher adjudicator costs. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and
the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompi, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?,
11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 329 (1996) (“If the arbitration process is significantly faster
and cheaper to undertake than litigation, the comparative savings in disputing costs should far
exceed the higher, unsubsidized, user fees charged by private arbitration organizations.”); Id.
(“counsel fees and similar costs of pressing the case generally dwarf user fees.”).
The evidence indicates that arbitration tends to have lower process costs than litigation. See
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitra-
tions, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 850 (2010) (“arbitration is less formal than litigation,
with less discovery and fewer motions, and appellate review of awards is limited”); Elizabeth
Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration under the Aus-
pices of the AAA, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 824 (2003).
research shows that middle- and lower-income employees and employees who arbi-
trated pursuant to promulgated agreements had no real, practical right to trial. This
study indicates that AAA employment arbitration offers affordable, substantial,
measurable due process to employees arbitrating pursuant to mandatory arbitration
agreements and to middle- and lower-income employees.
Id.; David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment
Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589 (2005) (studying
employment dispute resolution program adopted by anonymous business and reporting that
“since instituting its DRP system, ADR Employer 1 has cut its outside counsel fees in half”);
William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Hap-
pen? What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.–Dec. 1995, at 40, 44 (lawyers who
represent employer-defendants estimated their clients’ cost of lawyers’ fees, expenses, and court
costs averaged $96,000 in litigation and only $20,000 in arbitration); G. Richard Shell, Arbitra-
tion and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 521 n.24 (1989) (“average cost of defend-
ing customer-broker disputes in court was $20,000 per case as compared with $8,000 per case in
arbitration.”); U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Alternate Dispute Resolution: Em-
ployers’ Experiences with ADR in the Workplace 19 (1997) (during the first three years after
Brown and Root adopted an employee ADR program, it “reported that the overall cost of deal-
ing with workplace disputes (including the annual cost of the ADR program itself) was less than
half of what the company had been accustomed to spending on legal fees for employment-re-
lated litigation.”); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility:
Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008) (“Survey evidence and business
experience provides some evidence that the total costs of arbitration are lower than in litigation,
but the evidence is too limited to draw definitive conclusions.”).
32 One would expect this to cause “justice delayed” for litigants in congested court systems
while arbitration systems remain relatively uncongested. Unsurprisingly, empirical studies tend
to suggest that arbitration generally moves cases to resolution more quickly than litigation. See
DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DIS-
PUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 17, 26 (1998) (over
65% of companies gave “saves time” as reason they use arbitration); David S. Steuer, A Litiga-
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provides legally binding adjudication virtually free of charge to the
disputing parties, while the private sector arbitration system gener-
ally charges them market rates for it.
C. Who Deserves Subsidized Adjudication?
Which disputing parties deserve subsidized adjudication and
which should have to pay market rates for it?  Our society’s failure
to confront this important question allows all disputing parties to
pursue the subsidy for themselves.  The result is that parties who
do not deserve the subsidy—parties who should be paying market
rates for adjudication—are consuming public resources that would
be better spent on parties who do deserve the subsidy.
This problem can be reduced by confronting the question of
which disputing parties deserve subsidized adjudication and which
should have to pay market rates.  An alternative to yet another bar
association study on “underfunded” courts is to accept that, al-
though many other lawyers and I would like to see a much higher
percentage of government spending go to courts, that is not likely
to happen.33  So attention can shift to taking whatever is spent on
courts and focusing it on the disputing parties who deserve a sub-
sidy rather than on those who should be paying market rates.
tor’s Perspective on the Drafting of Commercial Contracts, in DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREE-
MENTS, supra note 31, at 459, 467 (“Arbitration normally proceeds faster than litigation . . . .”);
Eric Alan Stone & Jacqueline P. Rubin, Drafting Corporate Agreements: A Litigator’s Perspec-
tive, in DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS 483, 498 (2010) (arbitration “is, generally speak-
ing, faster”); Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 31, at 845 (“The average time from filing to final
award for the consumer arbitrations studied was 6.9 months.”); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth
Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DISP. RESOL.
J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 51 (time to final hearing was about three times faster in arbitration
than in court); Mark Fellows, The Same Result as in Court, More Efficiently: Comparing Arbitra-
tion and Court Litigation Outcomes, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, July 2006, at 32 (consumer claims
against businesses average 4.35 months in arbitration and 19.4 months in litigation. For business-
initiated claims, the figures are 5.60 and 15 months, respectively); Martin H. Malin, The Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289,
294 (2012) (“Professor Colvin’s work confirmed the speed advantage of arbitration. He found
that the mean time to resolve a case that proceeded to hearing and award was approximately
one year; in contrast, litigation takes at least twice as long.”); David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher
& Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical
Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1572–73 (2005) (reviewing empirical data and noting “few
dispute the assertion that arbitration is faster than litigation”).
33 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 31, at 383–84 (“The modern multi-door courthouse I paint as
a judicial Nirvana assumes a commitment of resources that may be highly unrealistic. . . . Unfor-
tunately, legislators and the public appear unwilling to make this commitment of personnel,
technology, and money to the courts.”).
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Which current recipients of subsidized adjudication should in-
stead be paying market rates for it?  For a paradigmatic case, imag-
ine two large corporations (Seller and Buyer) who hire expensive
lawyers to draft and negotiate their customized contract in which
Seller agrees to manufacture and deliver to Buyer a one-of-a-kind
machine in exchange for twenty million dollars.  After Buyer pays,
a dispute arises because Buyer says the machine Seller delivered
does not conform to the contract’s specifications, while Seller says
the machine does conform to the specifications.  All that is at issue
in this dispute is whether or not this one-of-a-kind machine con-
forms to this one-of-a-kind contract.  That is all an adjudicator is
going to decide—an issue that would likely take the form of
Buyer’s breach of express warranty claim (under Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-313) against Seller.
It is difficult to justify using the public courts’ limited re-
sources to subsidize adjudication of this dispute because:
(1) the parties can afford to pay adjudicator costs on their
own, without any subsidy,
(2) the parties had a pre-dispute contract and thus an oppor-
tunity to include a good pre-dispute arbitration clause in
that contract,
(3) the parties and their lawyers were sophisticated enough to
include a good pre-dispute arbitration clause in their con-
tract, and
(4) an adjudicator’s decision in this case is unlikely to produce
any significant “public good,” (in either the economic or
non-economic sense of that term) because all the adjudi-
cator is likely to decide is whether a one-of-a-kind ma-
chine conforms to the parties’ one-of-a-kind contract.
The last of these four points merits some explanation of “public
good” in both the economic and non-economic sense of the term.
D. When Is Adjudication a Public Good?
1. The Economic Sense of “Public Good”
In economics, a good is a public good “when the marginal cost
of supplying it to an additional consumer is close to zero.  A radio
broadcast is a prototypical public good.  Although the program is
costly to produce, once a signal is broadcast, it costs nothing for
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each additional viewer to tune in to a program.”34  Some argue that
an adjudicator’s decision is a public good insofar as it produces a
precedent because it “costs nothing” for other consumers of adju-
dication (potential disputing parties) to benefit from using that pre-
cedent “in deciding how to behave.”35  In other words, precedents
that clarify legal rules benefit others in society, besides the parties
whose adjudication produced the precedent, simply because clari-
fying legal rules reduces uncertainty about the legal consequences
of different sorts of behavior.  Over thirty years ago, in a now
“classic” article,36 William Landes and Richard Posner concluded
that leaving adjudication solely to the private sector (arbitration)
would under-produce precedent.
[P]rivate judges [arbitrators] may have little incentive to pro-
duce precedents. They will strive for a fair result between the
parties in order to preserve a reputation for impartiality, but
why should they make any effort to explain the result in a way
that would provide guidance for future parties? To do so would
confer an external, an uncompensated, benefit not only on fu-
ture parties but also on competing judges.37
Accordingly, Landes and Posner concluded, “[t]he precedent-cre-
ating function of adjudication . . . may invite public intervention in
the judicial-services market.”38  In other words, an argument for
government subsidies to adjudication is that in the absence of such
subsidies too few precedents will be produced.39
34 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 313 (1994).
35 Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043,
1114 (2005). David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2623 (1995) (“precedents and legal rules are public goods. Although the original litigants of the
cases ‘purchase’ the rules, future litigants use these rules without paying.”).
36 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 1091, 1099 n.32 (2012).
37 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235, 238 (1979).
38 Id. at 242.
39 Hay, et al., supra note 4, at 1944–45.
[A]rbitration . . . is unlikely to provide a full replacement for court-made precedent.
Even if arbitrators were as qualified as judges to make precedent, it is doubtful that
the parties would be willing pay the price for comparable services. And that price
would be quite steep, far higher than the cost of simply deciding the legal questions
for the sole benefit of the present parties. To begin with, arbitrators would labor
longer and more intensively to decide legal questions for the benefit of parties other
than those financing the proceedings; indeed they do this for the benefit of an entire
industry. In addition, to enhance the quality and coherence of the rulings, arbitration
would have to develop an appellate or functionally equivalent review process, and
the parties would have to pay its overhead. In addition, there is also a supply-side
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Of course, this argument prompts concerns and counter-argu-
ments.  First, can the optimal amount of the public subsidy to adju-
dication be determined?  Even if it can be determined in theory,
will the political system implement that amount of subsidy, and no
more, in practice?  Too large a subsidy can overproduce a public
good,40 and that includes the public good of law and precedent.41
Second, precedents created by adjudication are not the only
way to clarify law; legislatures and regulatory agencies can clarify
law by amending statutes and regulations to resolve previously
open issues.  Perhaps publicly-subsidized adjudication clarifies law
less efficiently than unsubsidized adjudication combined with in-
creased clarification by legislatures and regulatory agencies.42
Third, “even if widespread use of arbitration erodes the supply
of judicial precedent, this loss may be partially or entirely offset by
the value of having competing producers of law.”43  That is, per-
haps arbitrators tend to make better decisions than courts so arbi-
trator precedents—some arbitrators do cite each other’s
precedents44—tend to be better than court precedents and the
higher quality of arbitrator precedents more than makes up for the
higher quantity of court precedents.  In short, compared to court
precedents, arbitrator precedents might develop into “a superior
stock of legal capital.”45
problem. In the absence of proprietary control over the work product, arbitration-
made precedent becomes a public good. As such, competitive free riding among arbi-
trators will inhibit their investing optimally to make high-grade precedent.
Id.
40 See, e.g., Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 402, n.108 (1984).
41 Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 208 (2006)
(“How much law is enough law? Is publicly made law superior to privately made law? To what
extent can legislatures and regulatory agencies satisfactorily fill in for ‘lost’ judicial decisions?”).
42 See Id.
43 Weidemaier, supra note 36, at 1145 n.33.
44 Id. at 1100 (“some studies of international arbitration report that arbitrators often cite
other arbitration awards.”); id. at 1126 (“over half of the labor awards cited no precedent at all
. . . over three-fourths (76.2%) of the remaining awards cited at least one arbitration award and
over one-third (35.6%) cited only arbitration awards as precedent.”).
45 Keith N. Hylton, Agreements To Waive or To Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Anal-
ysis, 8 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 209, 243–47 (2000) (“In certain settings, parties may develop an
institutional common law through repeated dealings. An arbitral forum may have an advantage
in developing and interpreting that institutional common law.”) (citing the law merchant and
labor arbitration). See also Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing
Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
As the Widget Dealers Association arbitrators build a supply of precedents, they
can be contractually required to follow precedents in future cases. So the privately-
created law consists of not only unwritten norms and/or written rules, but also deci-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\14-3\CAC313.txt unknown Seq: 14 30-APR-13 15:32
912 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 14:899
Within economics, one can question whether the benefits
precedents confer on non-parties justify the public subsidy for ad-
judication.  Nevertheless, the premise that these external benefits
do justify the subsidy remains standard in the law-and-economics
literature.46  Even those who accept this premise recognize that
some precedents confer little value on non-parties.47  This lack of a
significant external benefit is likely true of the paradigmatic Buyer
v. Seller case hypothesized above because all the adjudicator will
decide is whether a one-of-a-kind machine conforms to the parties’
one-of-a-kind contract.  The precedent will likely provide little gui-
dance to other (potential) disputing parties about the legal conse-
quences of their behavior.  The law of express warranties is
inevitably very fact-specific and this case’s high degree of unique-
ness makes it especially unlikely to significantly clarify the law gov-
erning other cases.48  In sum, under the economic understanding of
the “public good” created by adjudicators’ decisions, litigating
sional law. In short, arbitration can produce a sophisticated, comprehensive legal
system.
Even better, it can produce many such systems.  The law—unwritten norms,
written rules and decisional law—of the Widget Dealers Association may differ from
the law of the Gadget Dealers Association. Both may differ from the laws of the
Sierra Club, the Alabama Baptist Convention, the American Association of Retired
People, the Rotary Club, or the Saab Owners Association. Thus emerges privatized
law in the fullest sense. There is diversity because what is best for some is not best for
others. But there is also a process of experimentation in which lawmakers learn from
each other and copy laws which seem better.  There may even be open competition
among different lawmakers to earn money by producing better laws.  A market for
law develops. This privatized system produces better law than does a system in which
government monopolizes lawmaking. The principles animating privatization around
the world apply to lawmaking just as they apply to coal mining or mail delivery.
Id. at 746–47.
46 See, e.g., Hay, et al., supra note 4, at, 1944–46.  For a contrary view, see BRUCE L. BENSON,
THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE 272–74, 277–86 (1990).  For a recent
study “offer[ing] insight into whether arbitration is capable of generating the public goods asso-
ciated with precedent,” see Weidemaier, supra note 36, at 1110.
47 Hay, et al., supra note 4, at 1921 (proposing that courts charge parties to “almost all com-
mercial-contract cases” a user fee to remove the public subsidy for litigation of such cases); id. at
1944 (“A good case can be made for retaining the subsidy for cases that present substantial
questions of law and thereby provide the opportunity for courts to make precedent.”); id. at 1925
(“Taking account of the public good of judicial precedent making, the proposed user fee would
be subject to an offset for costs attributable to the adjudication of substantial legal questions.”).
48 See generally Hay et al., supra note 4 (drawing a similar conclusion about contribution
cases). See Hay, et al., supra note 4, at 1946 (“Most contribution litigation involves largely fac-
tual disputes over whether and how much contribution payment is due. Resolving these factual
disputes has little (if any) precedential value. Indeed, these are factual disputes that would be
well-suited for arbitration.”).
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(rather than arbitrating) the paradigmatic Buyer v. Seller case is
unlikely to significantly further any public good.49
2. A Non-Economic Sense of “Public Good”
Some understandings of the “public good” created by adjudi-
cators’ decisions differ from the economic definition just discussed.
For example, an oft-cited article by Owen Fiss argued that the job
of courts “is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply
to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and stat-
utes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with
them.”50  Arbitration does not do this as well as courts, several
scholars argue.51  Even if that is true, however, it may not matter
regarding—or even apply to—the paradigm case between Buyer
and Seller.
The “Fiss view” that the job of courts is to “give force to the
values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes” may be a widespread view of cases involving claims based
on the Constitution or a statute of great public interest such as the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.52  But I do not believe it is a widespread
view of warranty cases between large corporations, even if such
49 On the other hand, perhaps we cannot know whether a case is creating a precedent of
importance until it is oft-cited (or not) by later cases.  For this point, I thank Mark Weidemaier,
who raises an interesting thought: perhaps courts could charge user fees (discussed below) to all
parties who can afford to pay them but then send royalties to parties every time their case is later
cited.
50 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984). See also Jack B. Weinstein,
Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 241, 295 (1996) (“The power to control the law and justice cannot be permitted to seep
out of the hands of the people through privatization.”).
51 Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New
Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 42 (2005) (“If the endowment of public adjudication
in the United States provides a baseline against which the democratic character of other dispute
resolution processes may be measured, arbitration under the FAA tends to fall short of the mark
in many important respects. . . . arbitration provides little accountability, as arbitration awards
are generally not subject to the substantive review that is available for decisions in public adjudi-
cation.”); id. at 43 (“Because of the enormous decisional discretion vested in arbitrators, arbitra-
tion does not, and arguably should not, provide any assurance of equal treatment of similar
parties in different cases, at least in the sense of the application of substantive rules. Quite to the
contrary, arbitration provides a highly individualized form of justice”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creep-
ing Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1661–65 (2005).
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-16 (2006); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of
Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 399 (1999) (employment dis-
crimination statutes are intended to “achieve the public goal of eliminating discrimination in the
workplace.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1664–65 (2005) (“we care more when federal statutory claims such as employment discrim-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\14-3\CAC313.txt unknown Seq: 16 30-APR-13 15:32
914 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 14:899
cases implicate a statute such as the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-313.  The values embodied in that statute (Article 2 of the
UCC) are basically the values of party autonomy,53 including free-
dom of contract,54 so an adjudicator “enforcing” the UCC in this
case will likely be just enforcing privately-created law, the terms of
the contract between Buyer and Seller.55  In sum, under common
non-economic understandings of the “public good” created by ad-
judicators’ decisions, litigating (rather than arbitrating) the para-
digmatic Buyer v. Seller case is unlikely to significantly further any
public good.
To recap, Buyer and Seller in the above paradigm case do not
deserve publicly-subsidized adjudication because they (1) can af-
ford to pay adjudicator costs on their own, (2) they and their law-
yers had the opportunity and (3) sophistication to include a good
ination are taken away from the public eye than when a dispute over the quality of soybeans
shipped from Missouri to Nevada is handled privately.”).
53 See, e.g., Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Georgia v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642
F.2d 744, 751 (5th Cir. 1981) (referring to “the Code’s devotion to the principle of party
autonomy”).
54 Michigan Nat. Bank v. Michigan Livestock Exch., 432 Mich. 277, 285 (1989) (quoting 2
White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (3d ed), § 21-2, p 135) (in Article 2, “freedom of
contract is the rule rather than the exception”); Hayward v. Postma, 31 Mich. App. 720, 723
(1971) (“The general approach of Article 2 of the code is that freedom of contract prevails”);
Milton M. Cooke Co. v. First Bank & Trust, 290 S.W.3d 297, 304 (Tex. App. 2009) (“the UCC
recognizes freedom of contract and specifies that parties may vary “the effect” of UCC provi-
sions by agreement, except as proscribed by the Code.”); Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging
Worldwide Standard for Protections of Consumers in the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Oppor-
tunity with Revised UCC Article 2?, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 223, 266 (2006) (“Current Article 2 and
contract law in general is premised on the notion of freedom of contract and party autonomy.
As such, Current Article 2 has very few limitations on the freedom of contract in the bargaining
process for sale of goods transactions beyond requirements of good faith and restrictions on
unconscionable contracts.”); Edith Resnick Warkentine, Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to
Protect Consumers and “Merchant/consumers” Through Default Provisions, 30 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 39, 44 (1996) (“Freedom of contract is a guiding principle of the U.C.C.”).
55 Hay et al., supra note 4, at 1955 (“In commercial-contract cases, most of the legal ques-
tions relate to ‘default rules’”); compare Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 780 (2002) referring to:
[T]he undisputed fact that for a large part of the twentieth century an increasing
volume of commercial disputes was voluntarily diverted by the parties from public
courtrooms into private chambers of arbitration, thereby relieving the strain on
overburdened courts without visibly damaging either the commercial life of the coun-
try or the American legal system,
with id. at 786:
If all contract disputes which the parties could not settle between themselves
had to be submitted to arbitration for resolution, rather than to a court of law, the
common law of contract would cease to be a living organism.  It would become
merely an historical relic, a legal King Tut in its elaborately detailed Restatement
(Second) sarcophagus, a ruler to be exhumed and displayed—even admired, per-
haps—but not obeyed.
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pre-dispute arbitration clause in their contract, and (4) an adjudica-
tor’s decision in their case is unlikely to produce any significant
“public good.”  These four factors, I suggest, counsel for ending the
subsidy to adjudication of the paradigm case.  Buyer and Seller
should be paying market rates for their adjudication, rather than
consuming some of the limited public resources that could other-
wise go to subsidizing more deserving litigants.
III. USER FEES TO END THE UNDESERVED SUBSIDY
A. User Fees
One way to end the public subsidy for cases that do not de-
serve it is for courts to charge the parties to such a case a fee high
enough to reimburse the court for its costs of adjudicating the case.
Imposing such “user fees” on litigants like Buyer and Seller might
lead those parties to avoid newly-expensive litigation and choose
instead to arbitrate, which would allow the court to devote more of
its resources to other (more deserving) cases.56  On the other hand,
if Buyer and Seller chose to pay the now-high court fees then the
money the court received from these fees could be devoted to
other (more deserving) cases. Either way, the subsidy now pro-
vided for cases that do not deserve it would be re-directed to cases
that do deserve it.
Proposals to raise court fees on some parties date back at least
to the 1980’s.  Then Solicitor General of the United States, Rex
Lee, concluded “that, at least in some cases, the costs of courtroom
services should be borne by those who use them.”57  Lee asked:
Why, for example, should the public subsidize a lawsuit between
Greyhound and IBM, or between Litton Industries and AT&T?
Surely others are more in need of public welfare benefits. Yet, in
each of those suits the public paid the bill for thousands of hours
of court time—at several hundred dollars per hour—to deter-
mine which of these corporate giants owed the other money.58
56 Buyer and Seller might make this choice through either a pre- or post-dispute agreement
to arbitrate.
57 Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of Litiga-
tion?, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 267, 272 (1985); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 131–39 (1985) (suggesting higher user fees for federal court).
58 Lee, supra note 57, at 269.
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More recently, a thoughtful article by Brendan Maher concluded
that “to functionally deny a poor person court access because he or
she cannot pay court usage costs is a very different matter than to
require one who can truly afford court costs to bear them.  In the
latter case, court access becomes a matter of choice, and a [party’s]
real choice to pay or to not pay costs does not offend our funda-
mental presumptions about how the world should be.”59
Just last year, a careful analysis by Bruce Hay, Christopher
Rendall-Jackson and David Rosenberg got specific about which
parties to which cases should be charged litigation user fees and
thus denied the public subsidy given to other litigants.60 Hay, et al.,
“conclude that the user fee should be applied to commercial-con-
tract cases generally”61 and explain as follows:
The main reason to apply the user fee in commercial-contract
cases and not in other types of civil actions is that, in the former,
contracting parties possess the practical means as well as the
strong motivation to minimize total costs of the project through
optimal contract terms governing price, performance, and reso-
lution of potential disputes. These contracts consequently mini-
mize total social costs (except for the overconsumption of
judicial resources). In other types of civil cases, parties lacking
access to judicially enforced civil liability would not be similarly
situated to minimize the sum of social costs from accident risk
and use of courts.62
In contrast to commercial-contract cases, Hay, et al., say, are “cases
that merit greater priority in gaining access to public judicial re-
sources. Generally, these are cases in which the claimants lacked
pre-dispute contractual means to control risk and provide for non-
judicial alternatives, and hence the principal social benefits of de-
terrence and compensation depend on court-enforced civil liabil-
ity.”63  In sum, the grounds on which Hay, et al., distinguish
commercial-contract cases from other cases are similar, but not
identical, to the grounds I used above to distinguish the paradigm
Buyer v. Seller case from other cases.64
59 Brendan S. Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527, 1547 (2010). “Are the
social positives associated with subsidizing contract disputes between public corporations (one
type of litigant) the same as those associated with subsidizing a tort dispute involving a poor,
elderly plaintiff (another type of litigant)? Perhaps. But perhaps not.” Id. at 1532.
60 Hay, et al., supra note 4, at 1919.
61 Id. at 1948.
62 Id. at 1954.
63 Id. at 1921.
64 See discussion supra Part III.C. listing my criteria as:
1) the parties can afford to pay adjudicator costs on their own, without any subsidy,
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Hay, et al., point out that imposing a user fee to parties to
commercial-contract cases “should lower the average delay” faced
by other litigants.65  In other words, imposing a user fee on parties
to some set of cases would reduce the perpetual “crisis” of “un-
derfunded” courts, crowded dockets and justice delayed.66
B. Practical Challenges Implementing User Fees
While employing user fees as a way to end the public subsidy
for cases that do not deserve it has the simplicity of an elegant
theory, translating it into practice would face a knowledge prob-
lem:67  how much should the user fee be?68
2) the parties had a pre-dispute contract and thus an opportunity to include a good
pre-dispute arbitration clause in that contract,
3) the parties and their lawyers were sophisticated enough to include a good pre-
dispute arbitration clause in their contract, and
4) an adjudicator’s decision in this case is unlikely to produce any significant “public
good.”
Similarly, Hay, et al., would impose their user fee only on “commercial” cases, which I take as a
rough proxy for parties with some sophistication and ability to pay.  In addition, they would
impose their user fee only on parties with the “pre-dispute contractual means to . . . provide for
nonjudicial alternatives,” Hay, et al., supra note 4, at 1921, that is, arbitration.  They advocate a
waiver of the user fee for cases likely to involve an important precedent, that is, public good. Id.
at 1940 (“The proposal’s waiver provision, which preserves the ability of courts to adjudicate
substantial questions of law, meets concerns about loss of precedent-making benefits.”).
65 Id. at 1954 (“By eliminating the excessive incentive of contracting parties to litigate com-
mercial-contract cases in court, the user fee should lower the average delay cost and thereby
increase the average deterrence effect across other types of civil cases.”).
66 As Hay et al., say, “in motivating the contracting parties to arbitrate more commercial-
contract cases, the user fee will open up space on dockets to enable speedier access to courts for
the other types of civil cases. Reducing delay costs for such cases may well increase the rate and
volume of their litigation. Consequently, court congestion is likely to remain constant notwith-
standing the application of the user fee. Solving the problem of court congestion will take more
than a user fee.” Id. at 1956.
67 See generally BARNETT, supra note 19, at 29–62 (for a discussion of knowledge problems);
see also id. at 54–57 (discussing the underappreciated role of prices in solving knowledge
problems).
68 Hay, et al., supra note 4, at 1941–42 recognize the difficulty of accurately setting the user
fee:
One major design problem, however, does not appear amenable to a precise
solution. This problem concerns the practicality of courts setting the optimal user fee.
To completely remove the public subsidy for adjudication . . . , the fee should effec-
tively tax the parties for the total social cost of adjudication. That cost has two com-
ponents. First, there is the judicial overhead: the fixed and marginal costs incurred in
establishing and funding the operation of courts to adjudicate [the relevant] cases.
This expenditure of judicial resources is both substantial and reasonably calculable.
We surmise that courts could readily compute and levy the tax without practical diffi-
culty in any given case.
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Each case—even each commercial-contract case—is different.
Different cases consume different amounts of the court system’s
resources.  Figuring out how much of the court’s resources a case
consumed would be difficult, even after the case is complete.
While Hay, et al., say the user fee should not be assessed and taxed
until the end of the case,69 this would be a change from current
practice of charging court fees at the start of the case.  More impor-
tantly, calculating the user fee at the end of the case would deprive
parties of the information they need to decide if pursuing litigation
is worth the user fee.  If you do not know the price of a service
until after you have consumed it, how can you make a sensible de-
cision about whether to purchase that service?  Some parties will,
perhaps quite reasonably, expect that their case will consume few
court resources and therefore trigger a low fee but, to the surprise
of all, see that their case turns out to consume a huge amount of
court resources and therefore triggers a huge fee.  Even leaving
aside the injustice of this rude surprise to a party, another problem
with not assessing fees until the end of the case is that the parties
may not be able to pay them. The court system would then be in
the role of creditor trying to collect from an insolvent debtor.  It is
much easier to insist on payment before providing the service, al-
though I suppose the court system could require parties to post
bonds to insure payment of the fee if the party is not able to do so.
Alternatively, if the user fee was (like current court fees) im-
posed when a case is filed, the court would not need to be collect-
ing debts for services rendered and the parties could take the user
fee into account when deciding whether to file a case. But a court
employee tasked with tailoring a user fee to a particular case
before the case is even filed would have an impossible job.  She
could not possibly know enough about how the case is likely to
proceed to accurately predict the amount of court resources it will
consume.
This knowledge problem might be ignored by just imposing a
flat user fee on, for example, all commercial-contracts cases.  Par-
The second component involves the social cost resulting from delayed adjudica-
tion. Calculating this element of social cost poses daunting practical problems.
Id. at 1941–42.  I agree that “daunting practical problems” bedevil their second component but
doubt that “the fixed and marginal costs incurred in establishing and funding the operation of
courts to adjudicate [the relevant] cases” are “reasonably calculable.”  I believe Maher also rec-
ognizes, but underestimates, the difficulty of calculating these costs. Maher, supra note 57, at
1541–44.
69 “To account for the incurred social costs, the fee would be assessed and taxed at the close
of the contribution case.” Hay, et al., supra note 4, at 1941.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\14-3\CAC313.txt unknown Seq: 21 30-APR-13 15:32
2013] IS ADJUDICATION A PUBLIC GOOD? 919
ties to some cases would overpay while others would underpay but
all of these errors might be tolerated as improvement over the sta-
tus quo.  In making improvements, we should let not the perfect be
the enemy of the good.
Alternatively, the knowledge problem might be tackled by
breaking the user fee into several user fees over the stages of litiga-
tion.  For example, imposing one fee at the time of case filing, an-
other fee if a discovery dispute requires the court’s attention,
another fee if a dispositive motion requires the court’s attention, a
fee for each day of trial and so on.70  This sort of sequential-fee
approach, common in arbitration,71 would enable courts to more
accurately adjust the user fee to the amount of the court’s re-
sources consumed by a particular user, and thus more closely ap-
proximate the optimal price.
IV. CONCLUSION
In short, user fees would make litigation look more like arbi-
tration,72 and level the playing field for competition between litiga-
tion and arbitration.  The class of cases subject to the user fee
would be the market for unsubsidized adjudication.  In this market,
70 Thornburg, supra note 19, at 259 (English court “[f]iling fees alone can exceed £1000, and
then each step in the process—such as assigning the case to a track, filing motions, holding
hearings, and receiving orders—also requires the payment of a fee.”).
71 See AAA Commercial Arb. Rules & Mediation Procedures: Admin. Fee Scheds. at 37
(2009) (charging an initial filing fee and final fee based upon the size of the claim, as well as fees
for anything that would be an additional service additional services: “The AAA reserves the
right to assess additional administrative fees for services performed by the AAA beyond those
provided for in these Rules which may be required by the parties’ agreement or stipulation.”);
JAMS Comprehensive Arb. Rules & Procedures: Case Mgmt Fees at 4 (2007) (JAMS charges
$400 per party per day for the first three days of a hearing and 10% of professional fees if the
time taken exceeds 30 hours.  The JAMS neutral additionally charges her own rates); ICC Rules
of Arbitration App. III Art. 2 (2012) (“In setting the arbitrator’s fees, the Court shall take into
consideration the diligence and efficiency of the arbitrator, the time spent, the rapidity of the
proceedings, the complexity of the dispute and the timeliness of the submission of the draft
award, so as to arrive at a figure within the limits specified or, in exceptional circumstances (Art.
37(2) of the Rules), at a figure higher or lower than those limits.”); see also U.S. Arb. Assoc.
Arb. Fee Sched., http://www.usadr.com/fee (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (charging a $500 per party
initial filing fee for controversies totaling over $75,000; $125 per party per hour for pre-hearing
conferences and scheduled hearings; $30 per party per quarter hour for document review of
motions, briefs and exhibits; costs plus 10% for the use of facilities; $125 assessed to a party filing
a counter-claim; and $30 per party per quarter hour for award writing).
72 Another step to make courts more like arbitration is “business courts.” See e.g., Christo-
pher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and The Future of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 491 (2009).
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the public-sector court system would compete, without the benefit
of a subsidy, against private arbitration organizations.  Conversely,
private arbitration organizations could compete against the courts
in the subsidized adjudication market.  This could be accomplished
by giving “adjudication stamps” to all disputing parties.  The
stamps would be good at a variety of courts and arbitration organi-
zations, much as food stamps are good at a variety of grocery
stores,73 or much as publicly-subsidized student loans are good at a
variety of private colleges and universities.
Both these proposals—user fees and adjudication stamps—
could be narrow or broad.  For example, user fees could be nar-
rowly confined to cases very similar to the paradigm Buyer v.
Seller case, that is, cases in which:
(1) the parties can afford to pay adjudicator costs on their own,
without any subsidy,
(2) the parties had a pre-dispute contract and thus an opportu-
nity to include a good pre-dispute arbitration clause in that
contract,
(3) the parties and their lawyers were sophisticated enough to
include a good pre-dispute arbitration clause in their con-
tract, and
(4) an adjudicator’s decision in this case is unlikely to produce
any significant “public good,” in either the economic or
non-economic sense of that term.
Such a narrow user fee would apply to few cases and thus provide
few additional resources for other (more deserving) cases.  The
same might be said of Hay, et al.’s proposal to apply the user fee to
commercial-contract cases generally because nearly all such cases
might well satisfy the first three criteria just listed and only com-
mercial contract cases that also satisfy the fourth criterion (absence
of “public good”) would pay the user fee Hay, et al. propose be-
cause they advocate a waiver of the user fee for cases likely to in-
volve an important precedent, that is, produce a public good.74
73 Foods stamps, now known as SNAP (“Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program”) may
be used at authorized retailers. See, e.g., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, available
at http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/snap.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (“You will continue to re-
ceive benefits as before and access them with the same electronic card at your local authorized
retailers and farmers markets.”); SNAP Retailer Locator, available at http://www.snapretailerlo-
cator.com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (providing a recipient the locations of the nearest partici-
pating retailers).
74 Hay, et al., supra note 4, at 1921 (proposing that courts charge parties to “almost all com-
mercial-contract cases” a user fee to remove the public subsidy for litigation of such cases); id. at
1944 (“A good case can be made for retaining the subsidy for cases that present substantial
questions of law and thereby provide the opportunity for courts to make precedent.”); id. at 1925
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In contrast, relaxing or eliminating the public goods criterion
would enable the user fee to apply to a broader set of cases—all
cases among wealthy, sophisticated parties with a pre-dispute con-
tract.  This would raise adjudication costs to those parties and thus
free up greater resources for cases that do not satisfy the first three
criteria, that is, cases among parties who are poor, unsophisticated
or lacking a pre-dispute contract (“strangers”).  So a desire to
make litigation more accessible for parties who are poor, unsophis-
ticated or strangers is in tension with a desire to subsidize adjudica-
tion of cases likely to create a public good, even if the parties are
rich, sophisticated and bound by a pre-dispute contract.  In the ab-
sence of higher funding for the court system, each dollar used to
subsidize the production of public goods in contract cases between
rich, sophisticated parties, is one less dollar available to provide a
“day in court” to the poor, the unsophisticated, and the parties to
cases between strangers.  As a result, different views about the im-
portance of the “public goods” provided by litigation may lead to
different views on the appropriate breadth of a user fee.
Similarly, different views about the importance of the “public
goods” provided by litigation may lead to different views on the
desirability of subsidizing arbitration to the same extent that we
subsidize courts as by giving “adjudication stamps” to all disputing
parties.  This is not likely to appeal to those who believe that arbi-
tration is less suited than litigation to producing “public goods.”  In
contrast, subsidizing arbitration to the same extent that we subsi-
dize courts will likely appeal more to those who place little value
on the “public goods” provided by litigation and who, instead, be-
lieve that the dispute belongs to the disputing parties so their
choice about whether to litigate or arbitrate it should not be biased
by a public subsidy encouraging litigation over arbitration.
(“Taking account of the public good of judicial precedent making, the proposed user fee would
be subject to an offset for costs attributable to the adjudication of substantial legal questions.”).
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